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At the end of the Survey is an Appendix of 1964 amendments
affecting procedural provisions. The Survey's time of publication
prevents the list of legislative changes (as approved by the
Governor) from being an exhaustive one, but it does contain
what is likely a substantial majority of those changes. The list
of changes in such of the CPLR rules as were promulgated in
1964 by the Judicial Conference is, however, a complete one
and also appears in the Appendix.
JURISDICTION

AND

SERVICE

Article 3 of the CPLR, covers jurisdiction, service and
appearance. The Legislature has not only retained the bases
of jurisdiction that existed under the CPA, but has also sought
to take advantage of the minimum contacts doctrine of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 2 by enacting a "longarm statute" to
provide yet further bases, Section 302 of the CPLR.
Section 302(a)(1)-The "Transaction of Business"
Section 302(a)(1) of the CPLR provides for the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when a cause
of action arises out of his transaction of business within the state.
Any application of this subdivision necessarily presents the problem
of whether a particular activity constitutes the transaction of
business. In Patrick Ellan, Inc. v. Nieves,3 the plaintiff's assignor
and the defendant executed a contract in New York whereby the
assignor contracted to provide a crew to take the defendant's boat
to the Virgin Islands. The plaintiff commenced this action for
breach of contract by serving the defendant personally in the
Virgin Islands, where defendant had established a domicile (which
the court termed "residence") subsequent to the making of the
contract. The defendant premised his motion to set service aside
(which is actually a motion to dismiss under rule 3211 (a) (8)) on
the theory that section 302 requires that the defendant be transacting business within the state at the time of the commencement
of the suit. Since the transaction had occurred almost two years
prior to the commencement of the suit, the defendant contended
that the section was not applicable to him. In rejecting the defendant's position, the court held that the making of such a contract
in New York was the transaction of business within the meaning
of section 302. In relying on McKinney's Practice Commentary,
the court quoted the following: " 'With the enactment of this
statute, New York has decided to exploit the fullest jurisdictional
potential permissible under federal constitutional restraints.' "4
2326 U.S. 310 (1945).
341
Misc. 2d 186, 245 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
4
Id. at 188, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
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There are some, notably Weinstein, Korn and Miller, who
argue that although section 302 permits the courts to extend jurisdiction to its "outer limits," it need not be so interpreted. 5 Whether
the intent was to extend jurisdiction to its "fullest . . . potential"

is doubtful, but the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure
did state, however, that its intention was to "broaden the bases
of jurisdiction." 6 This seems to favor a liberal construction.
Although the Ellam case has adopted a liberal interpretation
of "transaction of business" under section 302, the counterpart
provision of the UDCA 7 was construed more narrowly. In Home
Crafts, Inc. v. Gramercy Homes, Inc.,8 the plaintiff, whose place
of business was situated in Nassau County, brought a breach
of contract action against the defendant. The defendant had mailed
an order for chimney extensions to the plaintiff at its Nassau
business address and subsequently enlarged the order by telephone,
both of these originating from the defendant's place of business
in New York City. The jurisdictional predicate for the plaintiff's
cause of action was Section 404(a) of the UDCA. It was alleged
by the plaintiff that these two acts constituted the transaction
of business within the county.
In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, the court observed that it was plaintiff's business alone
which was transacted in Nassau County. The court, in construing
the statute, gave the section a "doing business" connotation by
stating:
It is not intended that any little contact with Nassau County or any

isolated transaction in this county shall serve as a convenient excuse to
bring into our courts defendants from other states and counties. The
intent is to subject to the jurisdiction of this court those persons or
corporations who engage in commerce and industry in this county. There
must be some pattern or continuity of activity of a substantial nature within
the county.9

51
(1963).
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61958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRAcTICF: AND PROCEDURE 41 [hereinafter

cited as

WEINSTEIN,

SECOND REP.].
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7UDCA § 404(a). Since the relevant words of that provision are
identical with those of § 302(a), the case has relevance under the CPLR
provision as well as under the UDCA. The converse is also true, i.e., a
§ 302 construction should have equal applicability under the UDCA. See
commentary on CCA § 404 in 29A McKINNEY'S JUDICIARY - COURT ACTS
(Pt. 3) 104.
841 Misc. 2d 591, 246 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1964).
9d. at 593-94, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 1555-56.
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In opposition to such an attitude, some authorities believe that
"solicitation of a single order may be enough to predicate jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from that order. . .. " 10
In the course of its opinion the court intimated that there are
two bodies of law, i.e., one for the small individual and one for
the large corporation. Said the court: "A corporation being a
creature of law whose presence anywhere is identified by its agents
is more likely to be called to defend a suit out of county or out
of state particularly where its business is affected by a strong
public interest." 11
The interesting point raised by this decision is whose business
must be transacted within the jurisdiction. Is a person who
is not in business and who personally purchases something in
another jurisdiction subject to in personam jurisdiction where
he bought the goods? That is, will the "longarm statute" apply
to a transaction of the plaintiff's business, or must it be a transaction of the defendant's business?
Although the legislative
history of the CPLR is silent on this point, at least one authority
has suggested that if a person unilaterally and without other
contacts mails an offer to a person in New York, where it is
accepted, the courts would not sustain jurisdiction. 12 This position
is borne out by Home Crafts. The case is not clear as to whether
it deemed the transaction a piece of the defendant's business, or
only a transaction of the plaintiff's business. Both parties being
corporations, it would appear that it was a "transaction of
business" for both of them. Therefore the holding appears to
be that the defendant's contacts with the county were insufficient.
With respect to the requirement that there be a transaction
of business, as opposed to other (i.e., non-commercial) activities,
a recent case has held that the making of a separation agreement13
between spouses did not constitute the transaction of business.
The court noted that the Legislature did not intend to exploit the
"outer limits of permissible jurisdiction," 14 and held that section
302 (a) (1) was meant to apply only to commercial transactions.'5
10 1

WEINsmIm,
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(1963).
"1Home Crafts, Inc. v. Gramercy Homes, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 591, 593,

246 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1964).

12 CARoDy-FoRKoscH, NEw YORK PRAcTIcE § 198 (1963).
13Willis v. Willis (Sup. Ct., New York County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,

Jan. 15,
1964, p. 16, col. 2.
14 Ibid.
' 5 In Jump v. Duplex Vending Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d
864 (Sup. Ct. 1964), the court held that where a third-party defendant
foreign corporation had no contact with New York, except that it shipped
the orders of the third-party plaintiff by sight draft to a warehouse in
New York, the third-party defendant transacted no business in New York
and it was not subject to in personam jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

